
2025 Inspection Deloitte AG

(Headquartered in Zurich, Switzerland)

June 17, 2026

THIS IS A PUBLIC VERSION OF A PCAOB INSPECTION REPORT

PORTIONS OF THE COMPLETE REPORT ARE OMITTED FROM THIS DOCUMENT IN ORDER TO COMPLY WITH SECTIONS 104(g)(2) AND 105(b)(5)(A) OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

PCAOB RELEASE NO. 104-2026-070



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2025 INSPECTION

In the 2025 inspection of Deloitte AG, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) assessed the firm's compliance with laws, rules, and professional standards applicable to the audits of issuers. Our inspection was conducted in cooperation with the Swiss Federal Audit Oversight Authority.

We selected for review three audits of issuers with fiscal years generally ending in 2024. For each issuer audit selected, we reviewed a portion of the audit. We also evaluated elements of the firm's system of quality control.

2025 Inspection Approach

In selecting issuer audits for review, we use a risk-based method of selection. We make selections based on (1) our internal evaluation of audits we believe have a heightened risk of material misstatement, including those with challenging audit areas, and (2) other risk-based characteristics, including issuer and firm considerations. In certain situations, we may select all of the firm's issuer audits for review.

When we review an audit, we do not review every aspect of the audit. Rather, we generally focus our attention on audit areas we believe to be of greater complexity, areas of greater significance or with a heightened risk of material misstatement to the issuer's financial statements, and areas of recurring deficiencies. We may also select some audit areas for review in a manner designed to incorporate unpredictability.

Our selection of audits for review does not necessarily constitute a representative sample of the firm's total population of issuer audits. Additionally, our inspection findings are specific to the particular portions of the issuer audits reviewed. They are not an assessment of all of the firm's audit work or of all of the audit procedures performed for the audits reviewed.

View the details on the [scope of our inspections and our inspections procedures](#).

OVERVIEW OF THE 2025 INSPECTION AND HISTORICAL DATA BY INSPECTION YEAR

The following information provides an overview of our 2025 inspection as well as data from the previous inspection. We use a risk-based method to select audits for review and to identify areas on which we focus our review. Because our inspection process evolves over time, it can, and often does, focus on a different mix of audits and audit areas from inspection to inspection and firm to firm. Further, a firm's business, the applicable auditing standards, or other factors can change from the time of one inspection to the next. As a result of these variations, we caution that our inspection results are not necessarily comparable over time or among firms.

Firm Data and Audits Selected for Review

	2025	2022
Firm data		
Total issuer audit clients in which the firm was the lead/principal auditor	1	2
Total issuer audits in which the firm was not the lead/principal auditor	35	17
Total engagement partners on issuer audit work¹	12	6
Audits reviewed		
Total audits reviewed²	3	3
Audits in which the firm was the lead/principal auditor	1	1
Audits in which the firm was not the lead/principal auditor	2	2
Audits with Part I.A deficiencies	0	0
Percentage of audits with Part I.A deficiencies	0%	0%

¹ The number of engagement partners on issuer audit work represents the total number of firm personnel (not necessarily limited to personnel with an ownership interest) who had primary responsibility for an issuer audit (as defined in AS 1201, *Supervision of the Audit Engagement*) or for the firm's role in an issuer audit during the twelve-month period preceding the outset of the inspection.

² The population from which audits are selected for review includes both audits for which the firm was the lead/principal auditor and those where the firm was not the lead/principal auditor but played a role in the audit.

Audit Areas Most Frequently Reviewed

This table reflects the audit areas we have selected most frequently for review in the 2025 inspection and the previous inspection. For the issuer audits selected for review, we selected these areas because they were generally significant to the issuer's financial statements, may have included complex issues for auditors, and/or involved complex judgments in (1) estimating and auditing the reported value of related accounts and disclosures and (2) implementing and auditing the related controls.

2025		2022	
Audit area	Audits reviewed	Audit area	Audits reviewed
Revenue and related accounts	3	Revenue and related accounts	3
Inventory	3	Inventory	2
Cash and cash equivalents	1	Income taxes	1

PART I: INSPECTION OBSERVATIONS

Part I.A of our report discusses deficiencies, if any, that were of such significance that we believe the firm, (1) at the time it issued its audit report(s), had not obtained sufficient appropriate audit evidence to support its opinion(s) on the issuer's financial statements and/or internal control over financial reporting (ICFR) or (2) in audit(s) in which it was not the lead/principal auditor, had not obtained sufficient appropriate audit evidence to fulfill the objectives of its role in the audit.

Part I.B discusses certain deficiencies, if any, that relate to instances of non-compliance with PCAOB standards or rules other than those where the firm had not obtained sufficient appropriate audit evidence to support its opinion(s) or fulfill the objectives of its role in the audit(s). This section does not discuss instances of apparent non-compliance with rules related to maintaining independence.

Part I.C discusses instances of apparent non-compliance with rules related to maintaining independence.

Consistent with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act ("Act"), it is the Board's assessment that nothing in Part I of this report deals with a criticism of, or potential defect in, the firm's quality control system. We discuss any such criticisms or potential defects in Part II. Further, you should not infer from any Part I deficiency, or combination of deficiencies, that we identified a quality control finding in Part II. Section 104(g)(2) of the Act restricts us from publicly disclosing Part II deficiencies unless the firm does not address the criticisms or potential defects to the Board's satisfaction no later than 12 months after the issuance of this report.

PART I.A: AUDITS WITH UNSUPPORTED OPINIONS

In the 2025 inspection, we did not identify any deficiencies that were of such significance that we believe the firm, (1) at the time it issued its audit report(s), had not obtained sufficient appropriate audit evidence to support its opinion(s) on the issuer's financial statements and/or ICFR or (2) in audit(s) in which it was not the lead/principal auditor, had not obtained sufficient appropriate audit evidence to fulfill the objectives of its role in the audit.

PART I.B: OTHER INSTANCES OF NON-COMPLIANCE WITH PCAOB STANDARDS OR RULES

This section of our report discusses certain deficiencies that relate to instances of non-compliance with PCAOB standards or rules other than those where the firm had not obtained sufficient appropriate audit evidence to support its opinion(s) or fulfill the objectives of its role in the audit(s). This section does not discuss instances of apparent non-compliance with rules related to maintaining independence.

When we review an audit, we do not review every aspect of the audit. As a result, the area below was not necessarily reviewed on every audit. In some cases, we assess the firm's compliance with specific PCAOB standards or rules on other audits that were not reviewed and include any instances of non-compliance below.

We identified the following deficiency:

In one of three audits reviewed, the firm did not assemble a complete and final set of audit documentation for retention by the required documentation completion date. In this instance, the firm was non-compliant with AS 1215, *Audit Documentation*.

PART I.C: INDEPENDENCE

PCAOB Rule 3520, *Auditor Independence*, requires a firm and its personnel to be independent of the firm's audit clients. This requirement encompasses not only an obligation to satisfy the independence criteria set out in PCAOB rules and standards but also an obligation to satisfy all other independence criteria applicable to an engagement, including the independence criteria set out by the SEC in Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01, *Qualifications of Accountants* ("Rule 2-01").

This section of our report discusses identified instances of apparent non-compliance with PCAOB Rule 3520. An instance of apparent non-compliance with PCAOB Rule 3520 does not necessarily mean that the Board has concluded the firm was not objective and impartial throughout the audit and professional engagement period. Although this section includes an instance of apparent non-compliance with PCAOB Rule 3520 that the firm brought to our attention, there may be other instances of non-compliance with rules related to independence that were not identified through our procedures or the firm's monitoring activities.

PCAOB-Identified

We did not identify any instances of apparent non-compliance with PCAOB Rule 3520.

Firm-Identified

During the inspection, the firm brought to our attention that it had identified, through its independence monitoring activities, one instance for one issuer,³ in which the firm or its personnel may not have complied with Rule 2-01(c) related to maintaining independence.

While we have not evaluated the underlying reasons for the instances of apparent non-compliance with PCAOB Rule 3520, the number, large or small, of firm-identified instances of apparent non-compliance may be reflective of the size of the firm, including any associated firms; the design and effectiveness of the firm's independence monitoring activities; and the size and/or complexity of the issuers it audits, including the number of affiliates of those issuers. Therefore, we caution against making any comparison of these firm-identified instances of apparent non-compliance across firms.

The firm reported one instance of apparent non-compliance with Rule 2-01(c)(1) regarding financial relationships, which occurred at the firm and involved its personnel. This instance related to an investment in an audit client by a member of the audit engagement team.

The firm reported to us that it has communicated the instance of apparent non-compliance to the lead auditor and that the lead auditor determined that its objectivity and impartiality were not impaired.

³ The firm-identified instance of apparent non-compliance does not necessarily relate to the issuer audits that we selected for review.

PART II: OBSERVATIONS RELATED TO QUALITY CONTROL

Part II of our report discusses criticisms of, and potential defects in, the firm's system of quality control.

We include deficiencies in Part II if an analysis of the inspection results, including the results of the reviews of individual audits, indicates that the firm's system of quality control does not provide reasonable assurance that firm personnel will comply with applicable professional standards and requirements. Generally, the report's description of quality control criticisms is based on observations from our inspection procedures.

This report does not reflect changes or improvements to the firm's system of quality control that the firm may have made subsequent to the period covered by our inspection. The Board does consider such changes or improvements in assessing whether the firm has satisfactorily addressed the quality control criticisms or defects no later than 12 months after the issuance of this report.

When we issue our reports, we do not make public criticisms of, and potential defects in, the firm's system of quality control, to the extent any are identified. If a firm does not address to the Board's satisfaction any criticism of, or potential defect in, the firm's system of quality control within 12 months after the issuance of our report, we will make public any such deficiency.

APPENDIX A: FIRM'S RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT INSPECTION REPORT

Pursuant to Section 104(f) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7214(f), and PCAOB Rule 4007(a), the firm provided a written response to a draft of this report. Pursuant to Section 104(f) of the Act and PCAOB Rule 4007(b), the firm's response, excluding any portion granted confidential treatment, is attached hereto and made part of this final inspection report.

The Board does not make public any of a firm's comments that address a nonpublic portion of the report unless a firm specifically requests otherwise. In some cases, the result may be that none of a firm's response is made publicly available.

In addition, pursuant to Section 104(f) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7214(f), and PCAOB Rule 4007(b), if a firm requests, and the Board grants, confidential treatment for any of the firm's comments on a draft report, the Board does not include those comments in the final report. The Board routinely grants confidential treatment, if requested, for any portion of a firm's response that addresses any point in the draft that the Board omits from, or any inaccurate statement in the draft that the Board corrects in, the final report.



Deloitte AG
Pfingstweidstrasse 11
8005 Zürich
Switzerland

Phone: +41 (0)58 279 6000
Fax: +41 (0)58 279 6600
www.deloitte.ch

25 March 2026

Ms. Christine Gunia
Director
Division of Registration and Inspections
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
1666 K Street NW
Washington, DC 20006

Re: Deloitte AG – Response to Part I of the Draft Report on the 2025 Inspection
(PUBLIC)

Dear Ms. Gunia:

Deloitte AG is pleased to submit this response to Part I of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board's (the PCAOB) draft report on the 2025 Inspection of Deloitte AG (the Draft Report). We believe that the PCAOB's inspection process serves an important role in improving audit quality, which serves investors and the public interest. We are committed to our shared objective of furthering the public interest in the preparation of informative, accurate, and independent audit reports.

We are pleased that Part I.A of the Draft Report contains no findings in the audits reviewed by the PCAOB's inspection team.

We have evaluated the matter identified by the PCAOB's inspection team described in Part I.B of the Draft Report and have taken actions as appropriate in accordance with PCAOB standards and our policies.

Fulfilling our purpose and responsibility to strengthen trust and transparency in the capital markets with integrity and ethical leadership is our top priority. As described in our [Transparency Report](#), quality informs every aspect of our Audit & Assurance business and is the bedrock of our strategy. Our pursuit of audit quality is at the center of our culture of continuous improvement. In order to drive continuous improvements, we are continuing to digitize the audit, transforming the way we work, and fostering the development of our people, to fulfill our role of providing high-quality audit and assurance services to the capital markets.



We believe an effective system of quality control is crucial for the consistent delivery of high-quality audits, and we continue to make significant investments in our audit and assurance processes, our people, and our technologies that underline our system of quality control to transform and continuously enhance the quality of our audits for the investing public.

We are confident that our ongoing transformation and related investments are resulting in significant, sustainable enhancements to our audit quality.

* * *

We also would like to recognize the efforts and cooperation of the Swiss Federal Audit Oversight Authority during the inspection process.

Sincerely,

Deloitte AG

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "A. Miolo".

Alessandro Miolo
Managing Partner,
Audit & Assurance

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "Joelle Herbette".

Joelle Herbette
NPPD/ARL

